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This paper presents ASN1SCC, an open source2 ASN.1 compiler that generates C/C++ and 
SPARK/Ada code suitable for low resource environments such as space systems. Moreover, the 
compiler can produce a test harness that provides full statement coverage in the generated code, and 
therefore significantly improves its quality. This paper also presents ACN, a new ASN.1 encoding that 
allows protocol designers to completely control the format of the encoded ASN.1 stream and hence 
integrate ASN.1 applications with legacy ones. With ASN.1 and ACN, various space protocols such as 
PUS3 can be modeled and with the usage of this ASN.1 compiler get automatic implementations of the 
encoders and decoders.  Finally, the ASN.1 compiler can translate an ASN.1/ACN definition into an 
Interface Control Document (ICD), thus allowing interoperability with projects and people who don’t 
know/use ASN.1. 
1. Introduction 
ASN.1 is a joint ISO/IEC and ITU-T standard that defines a flexible notation for describing data 
structures. It represents data structures in an abstract, but formal manner - meaning that the descriptions 
are platform and language agnostic, and that most importantly, they are validated by a machine (a 
program). An ASN.1 compiler is a computer program that translates an ASN.1 specification into code 
of a target programming language, such as C or Java. The generated code consists of two parts: (a) a set 
of data structure declarations (types) which are semantically equivalent with those defined in ASN.1 
and (b) a set of functions, known as encoders and decoders, which convert instances of the data 
structure declarations into a stream of bytes - and vice versa. The rules of the encoding and decoding 
process are defined by one of the standardized ASN.1 encoding schemes (such as BER, uPER, XER, 
etc) and are completely independent of the chosen programming language, processor architecture or 
operating system. Without ASN.1, the communication between an Ada process running inside an 
RTEMS/SPARC/LEON environment and a C process running on Windows/x86, requires manual 
implementation of message encoders and decoders in both processes. This kind of manual coding is 
tedious and error prone, since developers must deal with issues like integer word size, endianness, 
structure alignment, etc. If ASN.1 is utilized, the developers don't worry about any of the above issues 
since the encoders and decoders of the exchanged messages are automatically generated by the ASN.1 
compiler. 
 
The above features make ASN.1 an ideal choice for inter-process communication, especially in low 
resource environments. However, the existing COTS (commercial, off-the-shelf) ASN.1 compilers 
have some significant issues when targeting low resource platforms. In particular: 
(a) The generated encoders and decoders as well as the run-time libraries use dynamic memory 
functions (e.g. malloc-ed, heap data). In embedded environments, usage of dynamic 
memory is sometimes prohibited (e.g. satellites in space). 
(b) Programming languages important for embedded platforms are not supported (e.g. Ada). 
(c) Although existing ASN.1 compilers support many ASN.1 encodings, they provide no easy 
mechanism4 for the protocol designer to affect the binary format of the encoded messages. 
Interworking with existing, non-ASN.1 based systems, is therefore very difficult. 
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 ECN (Encoding Control Notation) is extremely complex and is currently supported by only one 
vendor. 
2. ASN1SCC 
ASN1SCC (http://www.semantix.gr/asn1scc) is an open source ASN.1 compiler that was built to meet 
the requirements of embedded/space platforms. It supports the major ASN.1 encodings: (a) Unaligned 
Packed Encoding Rules - uPER (b) Basic Encoding Rules - BER (c) XML Encoding Rules - XER and 
(d) ASN.1 Control Notation which allows the protocol designer to contol the binary stream (see section 
iv). As opposed to other ASN.1 tools, both the compiler and its run-time library are open-source. 
Moreover, it has a set of unique features that distinguish it from other ASN.1 compilers, and are briefly 
described in the following paragraphs. 
i) No dynamic memory  
The code generated by ASN1SCC, as well as the run-time library, never use dynamic memory 
functions (such as malloc). All memory requirements (i.e. the size of the encoded and decoded buffers 
for each ASN.1 message) are calculated at compile time. By doing so, all required memory can be 
statically reserved at compile-time, thus guaranteeing that there will be no failure due to lack of 
memory at run-time.  
 
For example, an ASN.1 type describing an array of integers... 
 
 
 
...triggers the generation of the following macro definition and C structure from ASN1SCC: 
 
 
 
Notice that the maximum size of the encoded data is available at compile-time, via the macro 
AnArray_REQUIRED_BYTES_FOR_ENCODING. This means that the user code can statically reserve 
the necessary space at compile-time, in global or static variables, thus guaranteeing the availability of 
the necessary space: 
 
 
 
The variable length arrays of ASN.1 (i.e. SEQUENCE SIZE(Smin .. Smax) OF T are mapped by 
ASN1SCC to C structures. These structures contain an inline fixed-size array of T with size Smax (i.e. 
the maximum possible extent of the array) as well as an integer field that stores the actual number of 
the elements used.  
 
The fact that the actual data are stored as an inline array and not as a heap-allocated block pointed to by 
a pointer (or similarly, a linked list with pointers to heap allocated objects), means that sizeof(AnArray) 
will always represent the maximum memory needs for the target type. This is true regardless of the 
complexity of the type (e.g. arrays of sequences containing arrays, etc) - and allows reservation of all 
the necessary memory space at compile-time. 
ii) Automatic Statement Coverage 
Critical software like space applications, must meet a set of guidelines - such as specific coding 
conventions, or thresholds about branch and statement coverage levels. ASN1SCC itself has its own 
regression checking suite, where thousands of ASN.1 grammars are used to drive the following 
sequence (for each ASN.1 grammar): 
 
• ASN1SCC processes the grammar and generates encoders and decoders for its types. 
• A template "main" function is created that encodes the main (root) grammar message, and 
then decodes it from the encoded data. 
• The generated "main" combined with the ASN1SCC generated encoders and decoders is 
compiled, and the generated binary is executed. 
• Checks are performed to verify that the message field data remained the same across encoding 
and decoding. 
• Further checks are done to see that no internal abnormal state was encountered in the encoder 
and the decoder during this “round trip” (even if this internal abnormality did not result in any 
externally visible errors). This includes memory access validations from Valgrind5. 
 
This test suite provides a baseline of confidence for the correctness of ASN1SCC and the code it 
generates. However, a valid question posed by a number of early users of ASN1SCC (space companies 
and ESA) was... 
 
 "How can we have increased confidence that code generated by ASN1SCC will correctly process 
all the - theoretically infinite! - messages that are possible under a particular ASN.1 grammar?"  
 
The caveat here being that, obviously, a project-specific grammar cannot be tested as part of the 
ASN1SCC quality assurance process - since ASN1SCC is not conceived with any particular grammar 
in mind. 
 
To address this issue ASN1SCC was enhanced further: it can now automatically generate a set of unit 
tests for a given input grammar. These unit tests are in fact sets of ASN.1 variable assignments - i.e. 
data assignments for the grammar's types. The key point is that these data assignments, upon encoding 
and decoding, exercise the ASN1SCC-generated encoders and decoders to 100% statement coverage. 
At the end of this test, the user knows for a fact, that (a) the encoders and decoders were exercised by 
the automatically generated unit tests so that all their code was executed, without any abnormal state 
arising at runtime, and (b) that the message data were perfectly preserved in the round trip (original 
data => encoded message => decoded message => same data).  
 
Assume for example that a simple ASN.1 grammar describes messages containing double precision 
numbers: 
 
 
In the course of encoding, decoding and otherwise handling these messages, the code generated by 
ASN1SCC has to consider all the possible "states" for this number: 
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When fed with this grammar, ASN1SCC generates a number of test cases, declared as ASN.1 variable 
assignments: 
 
 
 
ASN1SCC compiles these test cases and generates code for the target languages. The generated code, 
in tandem with a specially made test harness, is subsequently compiled by the compiler - and the 
resulting executable is then spawned under a coverage checking tool6. For each individual message 
(“test1”, “test2”, etc) the message content is encoded, decoded and verified to survive the round trip. At 
the end of the execution, the coverage checker reports the statement coverage in the encoders and 
decoders, and the test harness verifies that this is 100%. 
 
Notice that the process is automated - there's no human involvement. If, for example,  the generated 
test messages do not exercise a part of the code, the user will then get a notice from the coverage 
checker, that a part of the encoder/decoder is not tested. In that case, he can indicate this to the 
ASN1SCC developers (so that the required additional test case is generated) - or he can still identify 
the parts in question, and manually create additional tests for these cases, to reach 100% coverage. This 
feature is not currently available in any other ASN.1 compiler. 
iii) SPARK/Ada support 
To increase the quality of the generated sources in environments where very high reliability is 
expected, the Ada versions of the encoders/decoders generated by ASN1SCC use SPARK/Ada 
annotations.  
 
The SPARK language consists of a restricted, well-defined subset of the Ada language that uses 
annotated meta-information - in the form of Ada comments. This meta-information describes the 
desired component behavior and the individual runtime requirements. It therefore allows static analysis 
to be performed at compile-time as a further, automated check on program correctness. The static 
analysis verifies code invariants, preconditions and postconditions – that is, it applies Design by 
Contract principles to accurately formalize and validate the expected runtime behavior of the 
ASN1SCC-generated encoders and decoders.  
 
Assume for example the following Ada function definition, which divides two integers: 
 
 
The programmer implicitly knows that the divisor must never be zero. However, this knowledge is 
available only to the programmer, and not to the compiler. Therefore if this function is called by user 
code that calculates the arguments at run-time via an algorithm, the code may end up being called with 
a divisor value of zero - and an error will then appear and potentially crash the application at run time. 
To address this, SPARK allows programmers to enrich their interfaces with pre and post conditions. 
For example, the above definition in SPARK can be annotated as follows: 
 
 
 
The line starting with --# is a SPARK annotation which explicitly informs the SPARK examiner that 
the DIV function requires the divisor parameter to never be zero. This means that the SPARK 
examiner must check at compile time all the places where the DIV function is called and make sure that 
it is never called with divisor equal to zero. If this is not the case, the examiner reports an error. 
 
                                                          
6
 Gcov, coverage checking ( http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Gcov.html ) 
ASN1SCC's SPARK backend emits encoders and decoders that are annotated with SPARK 
annotations, thus allowing the static analysis to detect invalid usage (data-wise) of the API. In fact, 
PER-visible ASN.1 constraints are transformed into semantically equivalent SPARK annotations, and 
will therefore be thoroughly checked by static analysis, guaranteeing that a buffer overflow during 
encoding/decoding is impossible. 
 
For example, the following procedure is used in the encoding of a Boolean type in uPER. If the 
encoded value is true, then bit value 1 is written in the uPER stream - otherwise bit value 0 is written. 
 
 
 
The derives annotation informs SPARK about the dependencies of outputs from the input values. The 
pre annotation says that whenever this function is called the value of curPos counter plus one must be 
within the bounds of the outputStream array. Finally, the post annotation says the value of the curPos 
counter will be increased by one by the end of this function. 
 
The important impact of these annotations is that SPARK will be able to enforce these restrictions at 
compile time and thus an out of range exception in lines 13 and 15 is impossible. 
iv) Integration with legacy systems – the ACN encoding 
The major benefit of ASN.1 is that the encoding and decoding process is independent of the 
programming language, the hardware platform and the Operating System. Moreover, the standardized 
ASN.1 encoding schemes offer additional and significant benefits, such as speed and compactness for 
PER or decoding robustness for BER, etc. However, the existing ASN.1 encodings provide no means 
for the protocol designer to control the final encoding (i.e the binary format at the bit level). This is a 
problem for situations where a new ASN.1-based system has to communicate over a binary protocol 
with an existing legacy system. For example, the PUS (Packet Utilization Standard), which is used in 
space missions to encode Telemetry/Telecommands, cannot be specified in ASN.1 using any of the 
existing encodings (BER,PER,etc). 
 
To address this issue, we designed and implemented a new ASN.1 encoding, known as  ACN (ASN.1 
Control Notation). ACN allows protocol designers to control the format of the encoded messages at the 
bit level. In ACN, users can specify how each ASN.1 type will be encoded. Attributes can be set, such 
as the bit length of an integer, its endianness (big/little), its alignment etc. Moreover, for aggregate 
fields such as SEQUENCE, CHOICE and SEQUENCE OF the user can define optionality patterns, 
choice determinants, length fields etc.  
 
For example, to encode an unsigned integer in16 bits and align it to the next octet start (i.e. a stream 
offset in bits which is a multiple of 8), you would... 
 
ASN.1 MyInt1::=INTEGER (0..2000) 
ACN MyInt1[encoding pos-int, size 16, align-to-next byte  ]  
 
In the above example, the protocol designer specified via ACN that the ASN.1 type MyInt1 will be 
encoded as a positive integer, using 16 bits, and will always be byte aligned in the encoded buffer. 
 
A more advanced example of ACN, based on PUS: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a PUS packet. It consists of two main parts: (a) the Packet Header (area with the white 
background) and (b) the Packet Data Field (top right grey area). 
 
The Packet Data Field part is actually a composite field consisting of multiple sub-fields. The Data 
Field Header has two enumerated fields (service type and service subtype) which determine the actual 
form of the “Application Data” field. 
 
In other words, the “Application Data” field is a CHOICE type where the active alternative is 
determined by the combination of Data Field Header fields service type and service subtype. In ASN.1 
this can be modeled as follows: 
 
 
     PacketDataField ::= SEQUENCE { 
      ... 
      dataFieldHeader DataFieldHeader, 
      msg         ApplicationData, 
      ... 
  } 
 
  DataFieldHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 
      ... 
      service-type    INTEGER (0..255), 
      service-subtype  INTEGER (0..255), 
      ... 
  } 
 
  -- example of application data  
  -- (based on service-type/subtype combination) 
  ApplicationData::= CHOICE { 
      a1  MessageA, -- when the combination is 100,120 
      a2 MessageB, -- when the combination is 101,120 
      a3 MessageC, -- when the combination is 101,121 
      ... 
  } 
 
Figure 1: Automatic PUS encoding via ACN 
 With the appropriate ACN syntax, one can bind the elements of this ASN.1 grammar into a valid PUS 
specification: 
 
 
  PacketDataField { 
 ... 
 dataFieldHeader [], 
 msg < dataFieldHeader.service-type, dataFieldHeader.service-subtype >[], 
 ... 
  } 
 
  DataFieldHeader { 
 ... 
 service-type     [encoding pos-int, size 8], 
 service-subtype  [encoding pos-int, size 8], 
 ... 
  } 
 
  ApplicationData <INTEGER:servID, INTEGER:subServID> [] { 
 a1  [present-when servID==100 subServID==120], 
 a2 [present-when servID==101 subServID==120], 
 a3 [present-when servID==101 subServID==121], 
 ... 
  } 
 
 
The ACN present-when keyword is used to match the specific combinations of values with the type 
that the ApplicationData CHOICE is carrying. Notice that: 
 
1. The ApplicationData has a parameterized ACN encoding. This is shown with the angle brackets 
('<',' >'). Parameterized encoding means that this type cannot be decoded independently - it needs 
two extra values. In other words, the ACN decoder function for the ApplicationData type will 
have two extra parameters that must be passed by the caller. 
 
2. Likewise, the msg field in the PacketDataField, which is a reference type to the parameterized 
type ApplicationData, has two additional arguments, the dataFieldHeader.service-type and  
dataFieldHeader.service-subtype. So, a two way binding has been established between the two 
fields in the DataFieldHeader and the CHOICE type ApplicationData. Two way binding means: 
 
o during the decoding process, the CHOICE ApplicationData will read the values of service-
type and service-subtype in order to be decoded correctly 
o during the encoding process, the values of service-type and service-subtype will be updated 
automatically based on which of the alternatives a1, a2, a3 is present in the CHOICE 
ApplicationData. 
 
3. The present-when syntax within the CHOICE ApplicationData expects a boolean expression (in 
fact, a boolean AND expression), i.e. when all comparisons match, the selected CHOICE target is 
used. 
v) Automatic ICDs 
Interface Control Documents (ICDs) describe the binary format of messages exchanged between 
entities (the "wire format"), and are widely used in the space domain e.g. in the specification of 
space/ground interfaces.  
 
ASN1SCC can automatically create ICDs for a given ASN.1 grammar. This allows users who are not 
familiar with ASN.1 to easily understand the structure of the encoded messages, and if they so wish, 
manually implement the required encoding in their target environment, and interoperate. The ICD 
generator supports the uPER and ACN encodings. 
 
For example in the following ASN.1 message… 
 
 TestPDU ::= SEQUENCE { 
 int1 INTEGER(0..15), -- this field requires 4 bits 
 int2 INTEGER(0..65535), -- this one, 2 bytes 
 buf OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)) -- 10 bytes 
} 
 
 
... the compiler will create an Interface Control Document that will contain the following table: 
 
 
Figure 2: ICD generator output 
 
The above is an example of the visual layout of the generated document which demonstrates why this 
tabular / visual way of defining the data structures is more comprehensible for people not familiar with 
ASN.1.  
3. Use of ASN.1 in space application 
The interest of the ASN.1 data 
modelling language and of the 
associated tools (code and ICD 
generators) has been assessed by 
Astrium by retro-engineering a part 
of the ATV (Automated Transfer 
Vehicle) program. 
 
When code and documentation 
(ICD) generation techniques from 
ASN.1 are used, it can decrease 
dramatically the number of potential 
inconsistence: 
 
Figure 3: ATV Jules Verne, during its rendezvous with the ISS, 
on the 3rd of April 2008 
 
a. Between the software and its documentation: The definition of data has to be performed only 
once (in the data modelling language). The syntax and semantics checker ensure the quality of 
this description. Code and ICD are naturally consistent (modulo the quality and certification of 
the generation tools). Furthermore, whenever a change is made in the original model, it becomes 
immediately visible to both ICD and code, keeping them synchronised. 
 
b. Between communicating software components: When communicating software components are 
developed in different programming languages (Ada, SCADE, C…) or are running on different 
types of processors (ERC32, Leon…), they may use different incompatible memory 
representation of data. This requires generally a manual implementation of translation 
algorithms, which require a perfect knowledge of the compilers and of the hardware 
architecture. The ASN.1 toolset decreases dramatically the cost of the software development 
and suppresses the risks of incorrect implementation of the translation code. 
 
 Figure 4: Avionics / Software interface description 
 
c. For the Telemetry/Telecommand function: The TM/TC function implements the interfaces 
between the ground control center and the spacecraft. Often developed by two distinct 
industrials, using generally different programming languages and hardware architectures, 
formalizing the shared data is often a challenge. ASN.1 offers a large number of features 
allowing the full description of this interface, as specified by the ESA standard “Ground systems 
and operations - Telemetry and telecommand packet utilization” (ECSS-E-70-41). 
 
Figure 5: Ground / Board interface (TM/TC) description 
 
ASN.1 is today envisaged for the future generation of European 
launcher. The digital architecture of this launcher will be: 
 
a. Distributed: The flight software will be dispatched on several 
processors, 
b. Partitioned: Two pieces of software will run on a single board 
with a Time and Space Partitioning (TSP) hypervisor and 
c. Heterogeneous: The software will be partially coded in Ada, 
partially in C, partially automatically generated from SCADE 
 
ASN.1 is therefore the main candidate to capture the interfaces 
between the processors, between the partitions and between the 
heterogeneous pieces of code. 
 
The Ada/SPARK version of the ASN1SCC compiler could especially 
be used to automate the tedious and error-prone coding of the data 
encoding. 
 
Figure 6: Future launcher 
4. Future work 
 In the space domain, there are families of protocols that are customized on a mission-specific basis. 
PUS, for example, has a fixed mission-agnostic part that is always the same, and a mission-specific 
one.  We are currently introducing template support in ASN1SCC which will allow the users to 
“partially” define message structures that will be instantiated on a mission-specific basis when the 
mission-specific parts are known. This will allow optimal re-use of message specifications across 
missions. In this way it will be possible to aggregate ASN.1 specifications in a library of reusable 
components. 
 
For example, assume that there is a family of missions that use messages of the following type: 
 
mission A: Frequencies::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(10)) OF INTEGER 
 
mission B: Frequencies::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(25)) OF REAL 
 
mission C: Frequencies::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1000)) OF INTEGER 
        
Both the size of the frequencies array as well as the type used to represent frequencies is configured in 
a mission-specific basis. "Reuse" in such a context consists in copying and modifying the previously 
used definition (by way of example). Instead, ASN.1 templates would allow a generic template to be 
specified once in a simple and concrete manner. E.g. the reusable template component would be:  
 
PROBA-MISSION-TEMPLATES DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS::= BEGIN 
 
FrequenciesTemplate{INTEGER:someLength, SomeType } ::= 
SEQUENCE (SIZE(someLength)) OF SomeType 
 
END 
 
while the mission specific would be: 
 
PROBA3-MISSION DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS::= BEGIN 
FROM PROBA-MISSION-TEMPLATES IMPORT FrequenciesTemplate; 
 
Frequencies ::= FrequenciesTemplate{100, REAL} 
 
END 
 
Note that from an engineering perspective this is not about the number of keystrokes involved or the 
inconvenience of having to copy-paste and modify the definition used in the last mission. Without 
ASN.1 template support, the "generic" specification of what a frequencies table should look like is 
given in a human language – where as with ASN.1 template support, the specification is given in a 
formal notation, can be put under source control and can be leveraged by all kinds of tools (not just the 
ASN1SCC). 
5. Conclusion 
We presented an open-source ASN.1 compiler which was specifically made to target embedded 
platforms and their needs. The compiler includes support for features that significantly improve the 
correctness and verifiability of the generated code (like SPARK and automatic test case generation), 
and also supports ACN, which allows the user to control the binary format of the encoded messages. 
Moreover, it automatically generates interface control documents (ICDs) thus allowing seamless 
interoperability with non-ASN.1 entities. As demonstrated by the preliminary assessment from 
Astrium, ASN1SCC can play an important role in the implementation of safety critical applications for 
embedded platforms. 
 
 
